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IMBREE v. MCNEILLY: A VIEW FROM SINGAPORE
GOH YIHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Imbree v. McNeilly,l the High Court of Australia ruled that a learner driver is
no longer to be held to the standard of a reasonable but unqualified (and inexperi-
enced) driver in negligence claims. This overrules Cook v. Cook2 in this aspect and
necessitates changes in tort textbooks which have very often cited Cook in direct
contrast with the English position as embodied in Nettleship v. Weston.3 The con-
trast, which the textbooks have traditionally drawn, is used to illustrate the principle
that the objective standard of care required by the law is one that relates to the type of
activity in which the defendant is engaged, rather than the category of actor to which
the defendant belongs.4 Thus, whereas the English Court of Appeal in Nettleship
regarded that driving a motor vehicle requires the driver to be adjudged by the stan-
dard of a competent driver, the High Court of Australia in Cook was prepared to look
to the individual characteristics of the defendant as evincing a "special relationship"
with the plaintiff, to which effect was given by lowering the standard of care. This
distinction has now been erased in Imbree, which concerned a claim by a passenger
against an inexperienced driver of his car for injuries suffered. Imbree is certainly
an important decision whose significance will surely find resonance in varied areas
of tort law in time to come. It is the modest aim of this case note to show that
Imbree, while a decision on a narrow point, in fact hints at a larger difficulty in the
ascertainment of the standard of care in individual cases. It is in this context that
it will be suggested that, when the time comes for Singapore courts to consider the
applicability of Imbree, this difficulty should be borne in mind.
U. THE FACTS IN IMBREE
The facts in Imbree cannot be described as anything short of tragic. Essentially,
the appellant (who was the plaintiff at first instance), Paul Imbree, suffered serious
LL.B. (Hons.) (National University of Singapore); Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.
[2008] HCA 40 [Imbree].
2 (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376 [Cook].
3 [1971] 2 Q.B. 691 [Nettleship].
4 See generally Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2006) at 478-9.
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personal injuries in a motor accident on an outback dirt road in the Northern Territory
in Australia. The driver of the vehicle in which he was travelling lost control and
the car overturned. Matters had reached such a tragic conclusion when the appellant
allowed the first respondent (who was the first defendant at first instance), Jesse
McNeilly, aged 16 at the time of the accident, to drive his four-wheel drive vehicle
on a "very wide two lane dirt track with no significant corrugations". 5 Significantly,
the appellant knew that first respondent did not have a learner's permit but had driven
a four-wheel drive vehicle before. The appellant and his travelling party, including
the first respondent, in fact tried to obtain a learner's permit for the first respondent
earlier in the driving holiday, but failed to do so as the offices concerned were closed.
The accident occurred when the first respondent tried to avoid debris on the road
and lost control of the vehicle, which then overturned. The appellant was rendered
a tetraplegic as a result. He sued the first respondent and the owner of the vehicle,
the second respondent, for damages resulting from negligent driving.
At first instance in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Studdert J. found in
favour of the appellant, finding that first respondent had "behaved with carelessness
over and above what could be attributed merely to inexperience" and awarded the
appellant damages of more than A$9.5 million, although there was a deduction of
30% for contributory negligence. 6 On appeal by the respondents to the New South
Wales Court of Appeal, the majority found in favour of the appellant and regarded
the first respondent's actions as careless rather than just inexperienced.7 However,
the appellant's damages were reduced by two thirds for his contributory negligence.
The court followed Cook, which they regarded as establishing that "actions which are
fairly seen as the result of (a learner driver's) inexperience and lack of qualification
rather than as having been caused by superimposed or independent carelessness did
not, of themselves, constitute a breach of the duty of care" which the learner driver
owed to a licensed driver who was supervising the learner. The difference in opinion
between the majority and minority was attributable merely to the application of the
law, not to its substance. The appellant obtained special leave to appeal to the High
Court of Australia. The primary issue for the High Court of Australia to determine
was whether the decision of Cook should be overturned and whether a driver such
as the first respondent without a licence owes the same duty of care as a licensed
driver. This, in turn, concerned the related issue of whether or not Nettleship should
apply in place of Cook, to which this note now turns with comments (also) on the
Singapore position.
1II. NETTLESHIP IN AUSTRALIA AND SINGAPORE
A. Australia
While Heydon J. preferred not to express an opinion on the correctness of Cook,
the other judges in Imbree all expressed some view on the matter. There were three
principal judgments: one each from Glesson C.J. and Kirby J., and a joint judgment
from Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ. Crennan J. agreed with the judgments of
5 Supra note I at para. 30.
6 Imbree v. McNeilly [2006] NSWSC 680.
7 McNeilly v. Imbree (2007) 47 MVR 536.
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Glesson C.J. and Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ. In essence, Glesson C.J. thought
that Cook should be departed from as the standard of care ought to be objective
and impersonal, and not be modified by the personal attributes of the driver.8 In
coming to this conclusion, Glesson C.J. also stated that the fact the driver concerned
was subject to a scheme of third party insurance was irrelevant towards determining
the "common law principle" concerning the standard of care.9 In doing so, he was
perhaps subtly disagreeing with Kirby J. who, whilst prepared to depart from Cook,
would only do so provided that regard was given to the "important practical feature
of the universal existence of compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance". 10 For
present purposes, the reasoning of Kirby J. based on insurance is not of significance,
although that particular view would surely invite comment on other occasions. It is
instead the joint judgment that assumes particular importance.
In the joint judgment, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ. first considered whether the
four considerations laid out in The Commonwealth v. Hospital Contribution Fund11
were fulfilled to enable a departure from Cook. These four considerations, a rule of
Australian law but a manifestation of a broader principle of precedent, were sum-
marised in John v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation12 as being that (a) the earlier
decisions did not rest upon a principle carefully worked out in a significant suc-
cession of cases; (b) there were differences in the reasoning that led to the earlier
decisions; (c) the earlier decisions had achieved no useful result but considerable
inconvenience; and (d) the earlier decisions had not been independently acted on in
a manner which militated against reconsideration. In this respect, they concluded
that whilst the basis of the plurality in Cook was based on the now discredited (in
Australia, at least) notion of "proximity", 13 that was not a sufficient reason to depart
from Cook. The key reason for departure was considering the plaintiff's knowledge
of the defendant's personal attributes as being relevant to the determination of the
standard of care would encounter both "doctrinal and practical" difficulties. 14 As
to doctrine, it was said that the basic considerations of principle demand that the
standard to be applied is objective and thus knowledge of inexperience can provide
no sufficient foundation for applying different standards of care. 15 While it was
recognised that the law applies different standards in some cases, those standards are
applied uniformly, whereas the standard in Cook applied differently depending on
whether the plaintiff was supervising the defendant. This distinction was said to be
unwarranted and therefore Cook should not be followed. In an important part, the
joint judgment stated:
The common law recognises many circumstances in which the standard of care
expected of a person takes account of some matter that warrants identifying a class
of persons or activities as required to exercise a standard of care different from,
8 Supra note I at para. 10.
9 Ibid. at paras. 21-23.
10 Ibid. at paras. 110 and 143.
" (1982) 150 C.L.R. 49.
12 (1989) 166 C.L.R. 417 at 438-439.
13 In Singapore, the criterion of "proximity" has found renewed application after the Singapore Court of
Appeal's decision in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v. Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007]
4 S.L.R. 100.
14 Supra note I at para. 50.
15 Ibid. at paras. 53-54.
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or more particular than, that of some wholly general and "objective community
ideal". Chief among those circumstances is the profession of particular skill. A
higher standard of care is applied in those cases. That standard may be described
by reference to those who pursue a certain kind of occupation, like that of medical
practitioner, or it may be stated, as a higher level of skill, by reference to a more
specific class of occupation such as that of the specialist medical practitioner.
At the other end of the spectrum, the standard of care expected of children is
attenuated.
But what distinguishes the principle established in Cook v. Cook from cases of
the kind just mentioned is that Cook v. Cook requires the application of a different
standard of care to the one defendant in respect of the one incident yielding
the same kind of damage to two different persons, according to whether the
plaintiff was supervising the defendant's driving or not. In all other cases in
which a different level of care is demanded, the relevant standard of care is
applied uniformly. No distinction is drawn according to whether the plaintiff was
in a position to supervise, even instruct, the defendant although, of course, if the
plaintiff was in that position, a failure to supervise or instruct may be of great
importance in deciding whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
There is no warrant for the distinction that was drawn in Cook v. Cook. Cook
v. Cook should no longer be followed in this respect.16
Turning to practice, it was stated that it would be difficult to apply a variable standard
as it is unclear what "inexperienced" really means. 17 Chiefly for these reasons, and
notwithstanding that Cook has stood as authority for more than 20 years, Cook was
departed from in so far as the care that the learner driver should take is that of the
reasonable driver. Accordingly, it was found that the first respondent had breached
his duty to the appellant, but the damages to the appellant were reduced to take
account of his own contributory negligence. This brought Australian law in line with
the English position as articulated in Nettleship.
B. Singapore
The approach in Imbree also brings the Australian approach in line with the Sin-
gapore approach. Singapore law adopts Nettleship and not Cook. Indeed, perhaps
because of the heavier dependence on English precedents, Cook has never been cited
in a Singapore decision. In its place, Nettleship has been cited a few times, but none
as significant as in the Singapore High Court decision of Ng Keng Yong v. Public
Prosecutor.18 In that case, a Singaporean naval ship collided with a merchant ship,
resulting in the death of four crewmembers on board the naval ship. The two appel-
lants in Ng Keng Yong were charged (and convicted in the lower court) of causing
deaths by negligently navigating the naval ship. Before the Singapore High Court,
the second appellant argued, inter alia, that because she was a trainee officer, she
16 Ibid. at paras. 69-70.
17 Ibid. at paras. 56-57 (footnotes omitted).
18 Ng Keng Yong v. Public Prosecutor [20041 4 S.L.R. 89 [Ng Keng Yong].
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ought not to be held to the same standard as a reasonably competent and quali-
fied officer. In rejecting this argument, Yong Pung How C.J. held that to take into
account the second appellant's inexperience would be to render the determination
of the appropriate standard too ambiguous and uncertain. The second appellant was
therefore held to the standard expected of a reasonably competent and qualified offi-
cer. As a matter of policy, Yong C.J. regarded the outcome as sound: the second
appellant had control over a vessel which was plying in open waters with merchant
traffic and so she was responsible for the lives of her crew and the crews of other
vessels in the vicinity. 19 Accordingly, at least in relation to her crew members who
knew of her lack of qualification, the standard to which the second appellant was
held was consistent with the approach taken in Nettleship. It did not matter that the
second appellant was not qualified, or that her crew members knew about this; the
standard to be applied was an objective one devoid of any reference to her personal
characteristics. Yong C.J. stated that:
At the end of the day, the duty of care should be tailored not to the actor, but rather
to the act which he or she elects to perform: per Mustill LJ in Wilsher v. Essex
Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730 at 750-751. Holding a trainee to the same
standard as a qualified professional is also sound as a matter of policy... 20
Thus, as the law currently stands, the approach is common in England, Australia and
Singapore. However, certain difficulties remain and it is to them that this note now
turns.
IV. A COMMON PROBLEM IN SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA: "DEPARTURES"
FROM THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF CARE
The first point of interest is the reasoning in Imbree that Cook represented an unwar-
ranted departure from the objective standard of care. Whilst it is an oft-cited
proposition that the standard of care ought to be an objective one in as much as
it "eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the idiosyncrasies of the
particular person whose conduct is in question",2 1 it is equally true that this imper-
sonal standard takes account of the circumstances associated with the act. In this
regard, the repeated claim in Imbree that Cook represented a "departure" from this
objective standard begs the question: what is the content of this objective standard?
To say that a standard is objective is one thing; to give it content is quite another.
Objectivity in a vacuum is no standard at all. It would therefore be meaningless to
speak of the objective standard without considering the circumstances in which the
act concerned took place. Thus, if the act were the driving of a motor vehicle, the
standard applicable would presumably be that of a reasonable driver, as Imbree has
now held. However, within this categorisation of activity lies a fundamental presup-
position: the law carves out broad categorisations of activities on the premise that
these categorisations are "objectively" correct. Yet, in the example of the driver, why
restrict the activity to "driving a motor vehicle" instead of extending it to "driving
'9 ibid. at 108-9.
20 Ibid.
21 Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943] A.C. 448 at 457.
Sing. J.L.S.
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies
a mechanical device capable of lateral movement" or restricting it otherwise? The
underlying presupposition that these broad categories are objectively sound defeats
the notion that "objectivity" is a universal, single concept; if it is universal, then
there are many mini-universes, the domain of which can be subjectively defined. If
this is correct, then categorisation itself (which determines the objective standard)
is affected by something. In this respect, it is said that affection by "activity" is
acceptable, whereas affection by the "actor" is not: herein lies the distinction that
Nettleship and Cook are usually used to illustrate. However, this is a fine distinction
and it is at least arguable that the prior categorisation of activity is largely a matter
of semantics ultimately dependent on the characteristics of the actor. Thus, while
the knowledge that a plaintiff has of the learner status of a defendant driver does not
lower the standard of care, could it be said that the learner driver was not engaging in
the professional driving of a motor vehicle but in the amateurish driving of the vehi-
cle, reminiscent of Wells v. Cooper,22 thereby "lowering" the standard in like effect?
If categorisation were defined narrowly, then it answers the joint judgment's critique
in Imbree that a standard defined by personal attributes does not apply uniformly.
Uniformity being viewed from the point of categorisation, a narrow categorisation
necessarily imputes uniformity, albeit a narrower one. Therefore, to reject Cook on
the reasoning that to take into account the knowledge of inexperience is to offend
the objective standard of care is to ignore that (a) objectivity itself is determined by
the prior categorisation of activities and that (b) this prior categorisation is depen-
dent on the personal attributes of the defendant in so far that, semantically at least,
personal attributes can be expressed in the form of categorisation and the standard
set accordingly. If Cook is to be overruled and Nettleship followed, it might be that
this as a matter of policy affected by practical difficulties. Indeed, here, Kirby J's
reasoning on the basis of insurance is of some attraction.
V. A SPECIfiC PROBLEM IN IMBREE: COMMON PRACTICE ESTABLISHED BY
COOK AS EMBODYING STANDARD IN LAW
A second issue of interest arising specifically from Imbree is that whilst the High
Court of Australia was clearly alive to the longevity of Cook, it did not quite consider
the effect overruling Cook might have. One legal effect is that Cook established a
legal standard by which the driver in Imbree understandably took to be correct. In
choosing not to prospectively overrule Cook but to apply the new standard in Imbree
itself, it is arguable that the High Court of Australia ignored the possible argument
that conformity with common (and accepted) practice is evidence that the proper
standard of care had been taken: Brown v. Rolls-Royce Ltd.23 Whilst it is true that
common practice might be disregarded as showing the proper legal standard, Cook
had actually established the legal standard explicitly and assertively in Australian law
prior to Imbree, and definitely during the time when the facts in Imbree occurred.
As the joint judgment in Imbree acknowledged, but did not substantively deal with,
Cook must have "affected the terms on which cases have been compromised and
the apportionments of responsibility that have been made by courts and parties".24
22 [195812 Q.B. 265.
23 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 210.
24 Supra note 1 at para. 72.
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If the object of the objective standard of care is to enable the defendant to know
the standard he has to meet and to ensure the plaintiff compensation commensurate
with his expectations based on a reasonable standard, then in overruling Cook and
applying the result ex post facto to the facts in Imbree, it could be said that the High
Court of Australia preferred future legal coherence rather than present substantive
justice. Perhaps this would have been a good case for prospective overruling instead.
This problem does not afflict the Singapore position directly in so far as Nettleship is
good law and so will not (it is assumed) require re-evaluation. But the caution might
be a more general one and would apply whenever a local court chooses to veer away
from an established legal standard of care.
VI. CONCLUSION
Imbree will undoubtedly assume its rightful status as a landmark decision in time to
come. The outcome in the case-subject to concerns concerning common practice
outlined above-is a defensible one. There is much to be said about the impractical-
ity of an infinitely variable standard of care. But in preventing this scenario, the law
has invariably drawn potentially arbitrary categorisations, the bases of which have
hitherto not been fully explained. To maintain coherence in this area of negligence
law, it might be best to acknowledge the implicit policy dimension of the ascer-
tainment of the standard of care, rather than to explain it according to the blanket
distinction between "activity" and "actor" as apparently demonstrated in Nettleship
and Cook but which may now, for reasons apart from Imbree, require rectification in
the textbooks. This would, of course, as the foregoing discussion shows, affect the
position in Singapore as much as it would in Australia.
Sing. J.L.S.
